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SATELLITES & HONG KONG’S INDEPENDENCE: HOW THE 
TRADE OF COMMERCIAL SATELLITES IMPACTS 
DEMOCRACY ABROAD AND NATIONAL SECURITY AT 
HOME 
By: Nicholas A. Beekhuizen∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Trade laws have always struck a balance between political freedom 
and national security. The trade of commercial communication satellites 
(“CCS”) between the United States and Hong Kong is no exception. Until 
recently, Hong Kong held a special trade designation that allowed it to 
purchase CCS from the United States. This exception from the strict ban on 
sales of certain advanced technologies to China was allowed due to Hong 
Kong’s semi-autonomous status. However, China’s continued encroachment 
on Hong Kong’s autonomy led the United States to strip Hong Kong of its 
special trade status and ban the free exchange of advanced technologies. 
This note examines whether the decision to end Hong Kong’s special 
trade status will ultimately erode their political freedom. Additionally, this 
note argues that the United States’ strict ban on the sale of satellite technology 
will ultimately hurt its own national security interests. Therefore, the United 
States should maintain open trade with Hong Kong to ensure political 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On November 27, 2019, President Trump signed into law the 
Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019 (the “Act” or 
the “Hong Kong Act”).1 The Act requires the Secretary of State to 
assess and certify whether Hong Kong remains sufficiently 
autonomous from China to justify its special trade status.2 This special 
 
1 Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019, 133 STAT. 1161 (2019). 
2 CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA, Commissioners Reintroduce 
The Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act (June 13, 2019), https://www.
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status, among other things, permits “U.S. exports of advanced 
technology equipment to Hong Kong that may not be sold elsewhere 
in China.”3 
Exactly six months after the Act passed, Secretary of State Mike 
Pompeo announced that “Hong Kong does not continue to warrant 
treatment under United States laws in the same manner as U.S. laws 
were applied to Hong Kong before July 1997.”4 This decision, which 
was the United States’ response to China’s imposition of new national 
security laws on Hong Kong, removed Hong Kong’s special trade 
status and put a question mark on the future trade of sensitive 
technology.5 
There is a great deal of difficulty in balancing “any 
decertification decision” that challenges China’s ability to further 
erode Hong Kong’s democracy “against the need to maintain support 
for Hong Kong’s democratic-leaning population.”6 On the one hand, 
restricting the trade of advanced technology would prevent China 
from improving their own technological capabilities, potentially 
improve U.S. national security, and create an incentive for China to 
ease its oppressive grip on Hong Kong. On the other hand, to abandon 
free trade with Hong Kong could very well be an open invitation for 
China to complete its dissolution of all democratic institutions in the 
semi-autonomous city. 
This paper applies these two opposing arguments directly to 
the trade of commercial communication satellites (“CCS”) between the 
United States and Hong Kong. Besides its use as a bargaining chip 
against China, restricted trade of CCS could improve the security of 
U.S. and Chinese citizens. This is because despite stringent regulations 




3 Jessica Donati, U.S. Officially Declares That Hong Kong Is No Longer Autonomous, 
WALL ST. J. (May 27, 2020) https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-officially-declares-
that-hong-kong-is-no-longer-autonomous-11590596133. 
4 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, P.R.C. National People’s Congress Proposal on Hong Kong 
National Security Legislation (May 27, 2020), https://www.state.gov/prc-national-
peoples-congress-proposal-on-hong-kong-national-security-legislation/. 
5 Donati, supra note 3. 
6 Id. 
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satellites to China,7 there is nonetheless “a fleet” of such satellites 
serving the Chinese State.8 These satellites are used by China to bolster 
police power throughout its vast swaths of territory, which ultimately 
have assisted in the violation of human rights in Tibet and Xinjiang.9 
The human rights violations in Xinjiang, a northwestern region of 
China, are particularly dreadful, where “re-education” camps have 
been used to forcibly assimilate over a million Uighur Muslims into 
“acceptable Chinese citizens.”10 
This paper argues, however, that despite the potential benefits 
of restricted trade, the United States and Hong Kong would be better 
served by free trade of advanced technology. Part II of this paper will 
discuss the complex moving parts that have led to this critical moment 
in Hong Kong’s history, including: the passage of the Hong Kong Act; 
how Hong Kong received its special trade status; the state of political 
tension between Hong Kong and mainland China; and how China’s 
circumvention of U.S. export controls through Hong Kong is a national 
security threat. Part III will analyze how the restriction of CCS may 
ultimately erode Hong Kong’s autonomy and undermine the national 
and economic security of the United States. 
II. BACKGROUND 
To understand the unique risk that Hong Kong faces, this 
section seeks to describe the various moving parts playing into Hong 
Kong’s status under U.S. law, which include the following: the unique 
relationship of Hong Kong to both China and the United States; the 
history of Hong Kong’s fight to remain autonomous; how this fight led 
to the signing of the Hong Kong Act; and how the Chinese government 
 
7 See International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-30 (2020) 
[hereinafter ITAR]; see also Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 730-74 
(2020) [hereinafter EAR]. 
8 Brian Spegele & Kate O’Keeffe, China Exploits Fleet of U.S. Satellites to Strengthen 




10 Jane Perlez, China Wants the World to Stay Silent on Muslim Camps. It’s 
Succeeding., THE N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/25/
world/asia/china-xinjiang-muslim-camps.html. 
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has used Hong Kong’s unique status to circumvent U.S. export 
controls. 
A. The Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 
2019 
The Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019 
“reaffirm[s] the principles and objectives set forth in the United States-
Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992.”11 The 2019 Act sets out to support 
Hong Kong’s autonomy, democracy, and human rights, while also 
requiring that Hong Kong “remain sufficiently autonomous from the 
People’s Republic of China to ‘justify treatment under a particular law 
of the United States, or any provision thereof, different from that 
accorded the People’s Republic of China.’”12 The referenced treatment 
(or special status) under U.S. law has allowed Hong Kong to be a 
financial hub for the United Stated and its companies, which is 
reflected by the operation of 1,300 U.S. firms in Hong Kong and a $31.1 
billion trade-in-goods surplus in favor of the United States in 2018.13 
The special trade status also allows Hong Kong to import sensitive 
technologies from the United States that are not otherwise available to 
China, which creates a national security concern for the United 
States.14 
To protect Hong Kong’s fundamental freedoms and 
autonomy, the Act requires the President to identify and sanction any 
persons “responsible for the extrajudicial rendition, arbitrary 
detention, or torture of any person in Hong Kong; or other gross 
violations of internationally recognized human rights in Hong 
Kong.”15 These sanctions include ineligibility for visas, admission, or 
parole for anyone identified by the President in violation of the Act.16 
These sanctions vocalize American support for the pro-democracy 
movement in Hong Kong; however, the sanctions also leave open the 
 
11 Hong Kong Act, supra note 1, at § 3(1). 
12 Id. 
13 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, 2019 Hong 
Kong Policy Act Report (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.state.gov/2019-hong-kong-
policy-act-report/. 
14 Spegele & O’Keeffe, supra note 8. 
15 Hong Kong Act, supra note 1, at § 7(a). 
16 Id. at § 7(c). 
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risk of closing trade between Hong Kong and the United States, thus 
leaving Hong Kong’s autonomy vulnerable to further encroachment 
by China. 
The Act requires the Secretary of State to issue an annual 
certification that “indicates whether Hong Kong continues to warrant 
treatment under United States law in the same manner as United States 
laws were applied to Hong Kong before July 1, 1997.”17 Of importance 
is Section 5 of the Act, which requires an annual report on violations 
of United States export control laws.18 In particular, the Secretary of 
Commerce is to determine whether China uses Hong Kong to gain 
access to U.S. exports that are otherwise restricted.19 If it is found that 
these provisions are violated, the President is authorized “to block and 
prohibit all transactions in property and interests in property of a 
foreign person identified in the report required under subsection (a)(1) 
if such property and interests in property are in the United States, 
come within the United States, or come within the possession or 
control of a United States person.”20 
Put succinctly, the President can halt trade with Hong Kong if 
Hong Kong is deemed not sufficiently autonomous from Beijing. Upon 
the re-introduction of the Act to Congress on June 13, 2019, U.S. 
Representative Chris Smith (R-NJ) stated, “[i]t is in everyone’s interest 
that Hong Kong remain a free and prosperous bridge between China 
and the world. But if Beijing intends to force Hong Kong into becoming 
just another mainland Chinese city under authoritarian rule, the 
United States must reevaluate whether Hong Kong warrants the 
special status granted under U.S. law.”21 This statement summarizes 
the cautious intent of the Act to 1) support the pro-democracy 
movements in Hong Kong through free trade and sanctions against 
those who would harm Hong Kongers and their autonomy, and 2) 
 
17 Id. at § 205 (The provision means to treat Hong Kong as if it were still leased to the 
United Kingdom). 
18 Id. at § 5. 
19 Id. at § 5(a)(4). 
20 Hong Kong Act, supra note 1, at § 7(c)(1). Note that “subsection (a)(1)” refers to § 
7(a)(1) of the Hong Kong Act, which requires the President to identify persons who 
undermine human rights or autonomy in Hong Kong. 
21 CECC, supra note 2. 
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protect the national security interest of the United States should it be 
determined that Hong Kong is simply a proxy of China’s will. 
B. Hong Kong’s Relationship with China and the West 
Hong Kong has had a rich history as a Chinese territory since 
the third century B.C.22 However, the scope of this subsection begins 
with Hong Kong’s history as a British colony through its current state 
as a semi-autonomous city belonging to China. 
i. Control Under Britain 
In 1842, China ceded Hong Kong to Britain under a treaty at 
the end of the First Opium War.23 In 1898, Britain and China agreed 
upon a 99-year lease, which would end precisely at midnight on July 
1, 1997.24 In 1984, as Hong Kong’s transition to China grew near, the 
Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong (Joint Declaration) 
was signed by both the United Kingdom and China, and was later 
ratified and registered with the United Nations in 1985.25 
The Joint Declaration outlined what would happen to Hong 
Kong once the city was transferred to China. The Joint Declaration 
included the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region (“HKSAR”) and its semi-autonomous status under China rule, 
which would ultimately be coined as the “One Country, Two System” 
model.26 Under this model, Hong Kong would “become part of one 
communist-led country but retain its capitalist economic system and 
 
22 Becky Little, How Hong Kong Came Under ‘One Country, Two Systems’ Rule, 
HISTORY (Sept. 3, 2019), https://www.history.com/news/hong-kong-china-great-
britain. 
23 British Broadcasting Corporation, Hong Kong profile – Timeline (June 24, 2019), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-16526765; Guiguo Wang & Priscilla 
M F Leung, One Country, Two Systems: Theory into Practice, 7 PACIFIC RIM LAW & 
POLICY JOURNAL 279, 280-81(1998). 
24 Little, supra note 22. 
25 George E. Edwards, Applicability of the “One Country, Two Systems Hong Kong 
Model to Taiwan: Will Hong Kong’s Post-Reversion Autonomy, Accountability, and 
Human Rights Record Discourage Taiwan’s Reunification with the People’s Republic 
of China, 32 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 751, 756 (1998). 
26 Id. at 756-57; Little, supra note 22. 
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partially democratic political system for 50 years after the handover.”27 
A mini-constitution for Hong Kong, known as the Basic Law, was 
promulgated by China on April 4, 1990, and has been in force in Hong 
Kong since July 1, 1997.28 The Basic Law was intended to maintain 
Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy, basic rights and freedoms 
recognized while under British Rule, and other laws previously in 
force in Hong Kong.29 How the Basic Law was to be implemented and 
interpreted was unclear, as demonstrated by social unrest in the 
region.30 
On August 11, 1992, the United States passed the United 
States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (the “1992 Act”).31 The 1992 Act 
expressed Congress’s intent to continue to treat Hong Kong as a 
separate legal entity from China upon the city’s transition on July 1, 
1997, thus establishing Hong Kong’s semi-autonomous status and 
special trade designation under U.S. law.32 The 1992 Act states that 
“[t]he United States should continue to support access by Hong Kong 
to sensitive technologies controlled under the agreement of the 
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (commonly 
referred to as ‘COCOM’) for so long as the United States is satisfied 
that such technologies are protected from improper use or export.”33 
However, if the President is to determine that “Hong Kong is not 
sufficiently autonomous to justify treatment under a particular law of 
the United States,” the President may issue an Executive Order which 
suspends Hong Kong’s preferential status under U.S. law.34 
Thus, the great experiment began to see whether capitalism 
and democracy could survive under the “One Country, Two System” 
model. 
 
27 Hong Kong profile, supra note 23. 
28 Wang & Leung, supra note 23, at 756-57. 
29 Id. 
30 Little, supra note 22. 
31 United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5701-5732 (1992). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at § 103(8). 
34 Id. at § 202(a). 
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ii. Political Tensions Between Hong Kong and Mainland China 
Since the 1997 transition, the Chinese government has 
consistently encroached upon the sovereignty of Hong Kong and the 
tenets of the Basic Law, leading to mass protests on multiple 
occasions.35 In September 2002, Tung Chee-Hwa, the then-Chief 
Executive of Hong Kong, released a consultation document outlining 
its proposals to implement Article 23 of the Basic Law (the “Article”), 
which requires the Hong Kong government to quell any acts of 
subversion by the people.36 On July 1, 2003, approximately 500,000 
people marched in Hong Kong to protest the Article because of its clear 
encroachment on the autonomy of Hong Kong.37 Ultimately, on 
September 5, 2003, Tung Chee-Hwa withdrew the Article.38 Various 
protests in Hong Kong, involving crowds numbering in the thousands, 
would ensue over the years, including a June 2009 vigil on the 20th 
anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre.39 
Similar to the Article 23 protest, Hong Kong’s current battle for 
democracy began in response to a proposed bill that would encroach 
upon the city’s autonomy. On April 3, 2019, Hong Kong introduced a 
bill that would allow Hong Kong citizens to be extradited to China for 
alleged criminal activity.40 In a demonstration stemming from fear that 
China would use the Bill to prosecute Hong Kong citizens for political 
reasons,41 approximately one million Hong Kongers protested on June 
9, 2019.42 
 
35 Hong Kong profile, supra note 23. 
36 Tom Kellog, Legislating Rights: Basic Law Article 23, National Security, and 
Human Rights in Hong Kong, 17 COLUMBIA J. OF ASIAN L. 307, 309 (2004). 
37 Id. at 308. 
38 Id.; see also Huge protest fills HK streets, CABLE NEWS NETWORK (July 2, 2003, 
12:20 PM),http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/07/01/hk.protest/. 
39 Hong Kong profile, supra note 23 (Hong Kong is the only region of China that 
recognizes the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square protest). 
40 Hong Kong: Timeline of extradition protests, BRITISH BROADCASTING 
CORPORATION (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-
49340717. 
41 Jessie Yeung, From an extradition bill to a political crisis: A guide to the Hong 
Kong protests, CABLE NEWS NETWORK (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/
11/15/asia/hong-kong-protests-explainer-intl-hnk-scli/index.html. 
42 Hong Kong: Timeline of extradition protests, supra note 40. 
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On June 15, 2019, in an effort to calm the city, Chief Executive 
Carrie Lam announced that the passage of the extradition bill would 
be delayed indefinitely.43 However, the next day, on June 16, 2019, 
approximately two million people took to the streets of Hong Kong 
demanding the Bill be withdrawn completely.44 In the ensuing 
months, protests became increasingly violent between citizens and the 
police.45 These protests caught the attention of the United States, 
leading to the passage of the Hong Kong Human Rights and 
Democracy Act of 2019. 
In response to the increased tension with Hong Kong, China 
imposed new national security laws on Hong Kong that “criminalizes 
activities deemed as secessionist, subversive or terrorist and gives 
Beijing the authority to deploy state security agencies in the city.”46 
These new measures led the Secretary of State to declare that “[n]o 
reasonable person can assert today that Hong Kong maintains a high 
degree of autonomy from China . . . .”47 Pursuant to the Hong Kong 
Act, President Trump revoked Hong Kong’s special trade status.48 
C. How China Used Hong Kong to Circumvent U.S. 
Export Controls 
The revocation of Hong Kong’s special status means that the 
trade of CCS can be halted at any time. However, even while Hong 
Kong maintained its special status, China abused this trade 
relationship on several occasions. 
Two recent examples illustrate how China circumvented U.S. 
export controls to gain (or attempt to gain) use of American satellites 
through Hong Kong’s special trade status. These examples illustrate 
why the trade of advanced technologies has raised national security 
concerns for the United States and threatened the loss of Hong Kong’s 




45 Yeung, supra note 41. 
46 Joyu Wang, What Is the Hong Kong Security Law, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 10, 2020, 8:00 
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hong-kongs-security-law-what-china-is-planning
-and-why-now 11590088410?mod=article_inline. 
47 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 4. 
48 Donati, supra note 3. 
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Telecommunications Co. (AsiaSat), shows how China has taken 
advantage of loopholes within U.S. export control laws. The second 
example, involving a company named Global IP, was a thwarted 
attempt by China to funnel money through offshore firms to fund a 
Boeing satellite. 
i. AsiaSat 
Although the United States prohibits the sale of satellites to 
China,49 the United States does not regulate how a satellite’s 
bandwidth is used once the device is in space.50 Because of this 
loophole, nine satellites built in the United States are currently being 
used by China for various purposes, including beaming 
communications for police forces domestically as well as bolstering 
military power abroad.51 
AsiaSat, a Hong Kong company that defines itself as “Asia’s 
premier satellite operator,”52 has long acted as “a bridge between 
mainland China and U.S. satellite makers.”53 “AsiaSat’s two major 
shareholders are CITIC Group Corporation and Carlyle Asia Partners 
IV, L.P.,”54 which together own about seventy-five percent of the firm 
at the time of this note.55 Citic Group is a conglomerate owned by the 
Chinese government, while Carlyle is an American private-equity 
firm.56 
U.S. companies can sell satellites to AsiaSat, despite being 
partially owned by mainland China, because of Hong Kong’s semi-
autonomous status.57 Up to the time of this writing, AsiaSat has 
 
49 ITAR, supra note 7. 
50 Spegele & O’Keeffe, supra note 8. 
51 Id. 
52 Asia Satellite Telecommunications Holdings Limited, https://www.asiasat.com
/aboutus (last visited Oct. 22, 2020). 
53 Spegele & O’Keeffe, supra note 8. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. (Carlyle is one of the most politically connected private-equity firms in the 
United States). 
57 Id. 
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already launched nine U.S. satellites into orbit.58 Boeing is currently 
constructing a tenth satellite that, if it were to fall into the hands of the 
Chinese government, would be used to bolster China’s competitor to 
the U.S. GPS system.59 Once these satellites are in the possession of 
AsiaSat, nothing stops them from renting the bandwidth to the 
Chinese government. 
In response to this loophole, Congress added a provision to the 
National Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”), which “instructs the 
Commerce Department to investigate the national-security 
implications of the current [export controls] system and make 
recommendations on potential new export rules to prevent China from 
using U.S. satellites.”60 Carlyle Group claims that it “sends annual 
reports to the State Department to confirm AsiaSat’s compliance with 
U.S. export controls, ensuring that sensitive technical information is 
shared with authorized users only.”61 Additionally, Boeing has stated 
that it was unaware of any transfer of satellite technology that would 
violate its export license. “[Boeing] said it was neither possible nor 
required by law to monitor each bandwidth user after a satellite it built 
is in space.”62 
 
58 Spegele & O’Keeffe, supra note 8 (the satellites were manufactured by Boeing and 
SSL). 
59 Id. 
60 Brian Spegele & Kate O’Keeffe, Congress Orders Probe of Satellite Loophole 
China Exploited, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/congress
-orders-probe-of-satellite-loophole-china-exploited-11576624306; see National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92, 133 § 1198 
(2019). 
61 Spegele & O’Keeffe, supra note 8. 
62 Id. 
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Sources: Asia Satellite Telecommunications; Citic Group 
(Chinese end users); Carlyle Group (compliance reports) 63 
The NDAA seeks to fill the loophole that Boeing and Carlyle 
allegedly exploited. Among other things, the NDAA requires an 
examination of the effects on national security in regard to the AsiaSat 
scenario, as well as recommendations for a licensing/export regime 
that would prevent China from making use of U.S. satellites.64 
 
63 Id. 
64 See NDAA § 1283(c). 
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ii. Global IP 
China again attempted to circumvent U.S. export controls by 
ordering a nearly completed Boeing satellite through an American 
startup called Global IP, which was funded by Chinese state money.65 
The satellite was intended by the startup to provide internet services 
in Africa and “uses restricted technology relied on by the U.S. 
military.”66 However, had the deal been completed, China would have 
ownership over the satellite and would be able to use it for their own 
military, or reverse-engineer the satellite to bolster its own satellite 
development.67 
Global IP needed approximately $100 million in equity to 
convince a manufacturer to develop the satellite.68 They found their 
answer in China Orient Asset Management Co. (China Orient), a State-
owned Chinese company whose top executives are senior Communist 
Party members.69 Although China Orient agreed to fund the project, 
they could not directly fund Global IP, and hence Boeing, without 
setting off red flags and violating U.S. export controls.70 
Therefore, China Orient funneled their money to Global IP 
through an intermediary.71 The intermediary company, Bronzelink 
Holdings Ltd., was created in the British Virgin Islands by a Chinese 
businessman named Charles Yiu Hoi Ying.72 Global IP was informed 
by its lawyers that the investments from China Orient could now come 
through legally because Mr. Yiu “held a passport from Hong Kong, 
which is semiautonomous and deemed separate from mainland China 
under U.S. export controls.”73 A subsidiary of China Orient, Dong Yin 
Development (Holdings) Ltd., would lend the funds to Bronzelink, 
who would subsequently funnel the money to Global IP, who would 
 
65 Brian Spegele & Kate O’Keeffe, China Maneuvers to Snag Top-Secret Boeing 
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finally pay Boeing to make the satellite.74 In total, approximately $200 
million made its way to Boeing in this manner.75 
76 
Eventually, the relationship between Global IP and its backers 
soured.77 Mr. Youssefzadeh, one of the founders of Global IP, was 
concerned that Global IP could not prove its independence from 
Beijing and thus would be unable to own an American satellite.78 This 
 
74 Id. 
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concern, after being echoed by one of Global IP’s attorneys, led to the 
resignation of the founders of Global IP.79 
Boeing would later back out of the deal,80 which was followed 
by an investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission81 and 
pressure from at least one House member to determine when Boeing 
originally discovered China’s relationship with the deal.82 The recently 
passed NDAA will certainly give this issue a hard look, and will seek 
ways to prevent a similar incident from occurring. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Why China’s Illegal Obtainment of CCS Puts Hong 
Kong’s Special Status in Permanent Jeopardy 
Even if China were to revoke their most recent national 
security laws, China’s historical exploitation of Hong Kong’s special 
status creates another question of whether the special status is 
justified. Two specific provisions of the Hong Kong Act could require 
that the United States put the special status’ reinstatement on hold. 
The first provision is Section 5(a)(3) of the Act, which requires 
an assessment of “whether sensitive dual-use items subject to the 
export control laws of the United States are being transshipped 
through Hong Kong; and used to develop the Sharp Eyes, Skynet, 
Integrated Joint Operations Platform, or other systems of mass 
surveillance and predictive policing; or the ‘social credit system’ of the 
People’s Republic of China.”83 Indeed, both the Global IP satellite, 
 
79 Id. 
80 Brian Spegele & Kate O’Keeffe, Boeing Backs Out of Global IP Satellite Order 
Financed by China, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 6, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-
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which uses “restricted technology relied on by the U.S. military,”84 and 
the AsiaSat satellite, which “would enhance China’s competitor to the 
U.S. Global Positioning System,”85 are dual-use technologies subject to 
U.S. export controls.86 These dual-use satellites are then (or are 
intended to be) “transshipped through Hong Kong”87 and used by 
China. Although it is not with one-hundred percent certainty that all 
satellites are used for “mass surveillance,”88 a Wall Street Journal 
investigation found that Citic Group stated “AsiaSat’s satellites helped 
ensure communications for authorities as they quelled 
antigovernment protests and riots in Tibet and in Xinjiang, a heavily 
Muslim region in far-northwest China.”89 
The second applicable provision of the Hong Kong Act is 
Section 5(a)(4), which requires “an assessment of the efforts by the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China to use the status of 
Hong Kong as a separate customs territory to import items into the 
People’s Republic of China from Hong Kong in violation of the export 
control laws of the United States.”90 The language of the provision 
indicates that a conscious effort by the Chinese Government to exploit 
Hong Kong as a conduit of sensitive technology is required. For both 
AsiaSat and Global IP, the “effort” by China is apparent. China Orient, 
the financer of Global IP, had executives who were “senior Communist 
party members,”91 and financed Global IP through Bronzelink 
knowing that the deal would be impossible without Bronzelink’s ties 
to Hong Kong.92 Furthermore, AsiaSat has openly bought U.S. 
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satellites for decades despite their use by China.93 Citic Group has said 
that a satellite purchased by AsiaSat in 2013 was in the South China 
Sea, “where China has been building military infrastructure in a bid to 
control waters also claimed by the Philippines, Vietnam and others.”94 
It is apparent from China’s surreptitious use of Global IP and 
AsiaSat that China is taking advantage of Hong Kong to import items 
that would violate U.S. export controls. When the Secretary of State 
issues the next report regarding the autonomy of Hong Kong,95 the 
elephant in the room — besides the status of China’s national security 
laws — will be whether the United States can trust Hong Kong with 
dual-use/sensitive technology in light of China’s prior actions. The 
Secretary of State will have to determine whether “Hong Kong 
continues to warrant treatment under United States law in the same 
manner as United States laws were applied to Hong Kong before July 
1, 1997.”96 There is a strong argument suggesting that trade of dual-
use/sensitive technology with Hong Kong should be halted because 
Hong Kong has been unable to repel China’s attempts to snag U.S. 
technology. However, to abandon trade with Hong Kong would lead 
to the erosion of the “One Country, Two System” model far before 
2047. 
Indeed, many Hong Kongers see the United States as one of 
their greatest allies in the fight against China’s encroachment. After 
President Trump signed the Hong Kong Act, pro-democracy 
protestors again took to the streets, but this time waving American 
flags in celebration of the support from their Western ally.97 To halt 
trade with Hong Kong now would not only break its economic and 
cultural ties with the United States, but would also symbolically act as 
a concession to China’s authoritative fist over the region. As much as 
the United States’ commitment to Hong Kong’s freedom has provided 
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hope and morale to those fighting for democracy, the withdrawal of 
that commitment will certainly have the opposite effect. 
B. National Security as a Factor to Consider 
National security is a central question to consider when 
determining who may receive sensitive technology from the United 
States. Current economic realities, as well as the United States’ 
experience with periods of strict export regulation and de-regulation, 
point to the conclusion that restricting trade with Hong Kong would 
harm U.S. national security. 
i. Beginnings of Export Control 
Throughout the years, the Department of State and the 
Department of Commerce have swapped responsibility for licensing 
communication satellite exports.98 The Department of State, which 
regulates sensitive technology under the International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (“ITAR”), imposes restrictive measures on the export of 
items on the United States Munitions List (“UMSL”).99 The Commerce 
Department, which regulates sensitive technology under the Export 
Administration Regulations (“EAR”), imposes less restrictive 
measures on the export of items on the Commerce Control List 
(“CCL”).100 
The switching of satellite export control between the 
Department of State and the Department of Commerce reflects 
America’s constant policy battle between national security and 
economic growth.101 The United States’ modern export control system 
stems from the Cold War, where the United States’ primary concern 
was preventing American technology from reaching the former Soviet 
Union.102 This focus on national security did not change significantly 
until March 14, 1996, “when President Bill Clinton moved the satellite 
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licensing function from the State Department to the Commerce 
Department.”103 By October 1996, the business-friendly Commerce 
Department had control over all communication satellites.104 
The move towards less-restrictive satellite exports was quickly 
washed away in the wake of the “Hughes and Loral Incidents.”105 Put 
succinctly, Hughes and Loral, two satellite manufacturers, transferred 
sensitive technical data to the Chinese government, with whom they 
were doing business.106 In response, the United States created the 
Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial 
Concerns with the People’s Republic of China (Cox Committee), which 
among other things, was tasked to answer whether “the transfer of 
technology contributed to the enhancement of the accuracy of nuclear 
armed intercontinental ballistic missiles of the People’s Republic of 
China, missiles that right this minute are aimed at the United States of 
America.”107 
The Cox Committee issued a report on its findings and 
recommended thirty-eight changes to the Clinton Administration’s 
export controls with respect to China.108 In response to the report, 
“Congress passed legislation transferring the authority, effective 
March 15, 1999, to license exports of CCS to the Department of 
State.”109 Thus, almost as soon as the commercial satellite industry 
received a more business-friendly environment, export controls once 
again became more stringent.110 
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ii. Obama-era Deregulation 
In May 2012, an amendment to the 2013 National Defense 
Authorization Act (“2013 NDAA”)111 was put forth that “[w]ould 
remove commercial satellites and related components from the United 
States [M]unitions [L]ist.”112 Both proponents and detractors of the 
amendment believed that pure economics was the reason for the 
change.113 Although control by the Department of State resulted from 
national security concerns, it turned out that the resulting non-
competitiveness of American satellite manufacturers against the rest 
of the world would overshadow the need for a strict export regime. 
Indeed, the State and Commerce Departments agreed that 
more stringent export controls caused a lack of American 
competitiveness in the space industry, which would be detrimental to 
U.S. national security.114 The negative economic effect of ITAR is 
evidenced by the United States’ control of 73 percent of the world’s 
commercial satellite market in 1998 (the year before ITAR), and only 
27 percent of the market two years later.115 In this period, “Europe’s 
share rose from about a quarter to more than half.”116 
Obama’s export control overhaul was outlined by then-
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, who proposed a four-prong 
approach to export reform, which included: a single export control 
licensing agency for both dual-use, munitions and exports licensed to 
embargoed destinations; a unified control list; a single enforcement 
coordination agency; and a single integrated information technology 
system.117 The Obama Administration planned on implementing these 
changes through three phases. Phase I would “harmonize the 
Commerce Control List (CCL) with the U.S. Munitions List 
 
111 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, 
126 Stat. 1632. 
112 Zinger, supra note 98, at 368-69 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 112-485, at 43 (2012)). 
113 Compare Zinger, supra note 98, with Fitzgerald, supra note 99. 
114 Zinger, supra note 98, at 375. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. (quoting Benjamin Sutherland, Why the U.S. Space Industry Lags Behind 
Europe’s, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 30, 2009, 7:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/why-us-
spaceindustry-lags-behind-europes-77797). 
117 Fergusson & Kerr, supra note 109, at 1-2. 
142 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 28 
(USML).”118 Next, “Phase II would implement a harmonized licensing 
system with two identically-structured tiered control lists, potentially 
allowing for a reduction in the amount of licenses required by the 
system.”119 Finally, Phase III, which would require legislation, “would 
establish a single licensing agency; merge the two harmonized, tiered 
control lists, with mechanisms for review and updating; merge the two 
primary export control enforcement agencies, OEE and ICE; and 
operationalize a single IT system for licensing and enforcement.”120 
 
President’s Export Control Reform Initiative121 
Source: Prepared by Dianne Rennack, CRS, based on White House 
Fact Sheet, April 20, 2010. 
 
It was not until January 2017 that the Obama Administration 
finally moved Commercial Communication Satellites from the USML 
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an unacceptable security risk.”124 This review, along with persistent 
lobbying by satellite manufacturers, ultimately allowed for the 
January 2017 change to the CCL.125 The de-regulatory approach to 
CCSs and export controls in general continued into the Trump 
Administration. 
iii. Export Control Under President Trump 
The Trump Administration’s continuation of Obama’s export 
control de-regulation is part of a larger overhaul of the entire U.S. 
space industry.126 Some of the major proposals affecting the space 
industry, and commercial satellites specifically, include the Space 
Policy Directive–2 (“SPD2”), Streamlining Regulations on Commercial 
Use of Space; the American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act (H.R. 
2809); and the Space Frontier Act of 2018 (S. 3277).127 One of the goals 
of the Trump Administration is to make the export of commercial 
satellites easier for private entities, but of course, “the challenge for 
that process is balancing industry’s need for timeliness and 
transparency with the government’s need to meet national security 
and foreign policy objectives.”128 
The main proposal affecting the Department of Commerce’s 
control over commercial satellites is the Space Policy Directive-2. SPD2 
states several regulatory goals, the first being to “promote economic 
growth,” and the penultimate to “protect national security, public-
safety, and foreign policy interests.”129 SPD2 proposes a 
reorganization of the Department of Commerce, with the purpose of 
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which would move several offices within the Department to a new 
office called the Space Policy Advancing Commercial Enterprise 
(SPACE) Administration.130 SPACE will serve to act as a “one-stop 
shop” attempting to streamline the various licenses required for 
commercial space flight and commercial exports of space 
technology.131 In light of the recent scandals involving AsiaSat and 
Global IP, the Trump Administration will have to take a hard look at 
how far deregulation will go, and whether a proper balance can be 
struck between economic growth and national security. 
iv. National Security Would Be Undermined if Trade with 
Hong Kong Halted 
Although seemingly counter-intuitive, it is likely that U.S. 
national security will benefit from maintaining open trade (and 
specifically continued exportation of satellites) with Hong Kong, even 
if it risks satellite technology making its way to the Chinese 
government. Certainly, there should be restrictions for highly sensitive 
or military technology. However, the export of commercial satellites to 
Hong Kong should become less restrictive. U.S. national security 
would benefit from a less restrictive satellite export regime to Hong 
Kong for the following two reasons. First, the economic benefits from 
open trade would promote U.S. dominance in the world satellite 
market, which would ensure that the United States continues to 
develop the best technology, while older technology trickles its way to 
China. Second, satellite technology would make it to China through 
other competitors regardless of whether the United States halts trade 
with Hong Kong. 
Despite the persistent workaround of U.S. export controls by 
the Chinese, “U.S. officials and industry players have said the profits 
American satellite exports generated could be reinvested in 
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development to keep the U.S ahead.”132 Indeed, as the commercial 
satellite industry continues to burgeon,133 it is imperative that the U.S. 
allows its private sector,134 which has increasingly been at the forefront 
of the U.S. space industry, to have more freedom in its operations. 
Since Obama’s export control overhaul and continuing 
through the Trump Administration’s broader space industry overhaul, 
the United States has been on track for its private sector to lead the 
world in space and satellite technologies. In 2017, the National Space 
Council met for the first time since it was disbanded in 1993 to discuss 
how the United States can assert leadership in space.135 There, 
“SpaceX136 President and COO Gwynne Shotwell called for 
deregulation” and stated “it requires heroics” to deal with the current 
regulatory state.137 
A perfect example of where supporting the U.S. private sector 
is necessary to outpace China’s satellite technology is a comparison of 
SpaceX’s Star Link project with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The 
goal of Star Link is to surround the globe with approximately 12,000 
small138 satellites, which would “[blanket] the Earth with high-speed, 
low-latency, and affordable internet access.”139 The initial focus is to 
provide services to the United States and Canada,140 but eventually 
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even remote areas of the world will be reached.141 So far, Star Link is 
moving at a steady pace with its third batch of sixty satellites launched 
into orbit on January 6th, 2019.142 
With a similar goal of connecting the world, China’s Belt and 
Road Initiative (“BRI”) seeks to “[create] a vast network of railways, 
energy pipelines, highways, and streamlined border crossings, both 
westward—through the mountainous former Soviet republics—and 
southward, to Pakistan, India, and the rest of Southeast Asia.”143 
Additionally, over sixty countries have signed on to projects or 
indicated interest with the BRI.144 While the BRI purports to bolster the 
economy of involved countries, “the United States shares the concern 
of some in Asia that the BRI could be a Trojan horse for China-led 
regional development, military expansion, and Beijing-controlled 
institutions.”145 
The BRI is also competing with the United States and its 
private sector in space. Similar to Starlink, BeiDou satellites, China’s 
competitor to the U.S. GPS system,146 are being used to make a “space 
silk road” that will attempt to provide global coverage.147 With the 
addition of BeiDou to the BRI, the project has now been described as 
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“a multi-dimensional super-project with a land, sea and space 
presence” and creating a “virtual umbrella” with an “extensive zone 
of influence.”148 With such an aggressive expansion of Chinese 
influence, it is apparent why the United States would be cautious 
about China using Hong Kong as a customs territory to steal U.S. 
satellite technology. However, the focus of the United States should be 
on its ability to use free markets and private enterprise to keep ahead 
of its competitors. 
Private companies such as SpaceX and Blue Origin, with their 
respective satellite constellation projects, are the United States’ way of 
competing with China. The strength of the United States has always 
been its free markets and private enterprise, and the United States 
should depend on this strength to lead the world in space technology, 
which would consequently further protect U.S. interests. Thus, for 
national security purposes, the United States should maintain Hong 
Kong as another valuable marketplace for private companies. 
Evidence of Hong Kong’s importance in supporting the economic 
needs of U.S. companies is the $31.1 billion trade-in-goods surplus in 
favor of the United States in 2018.149 By easing restrictions in this 
lucrative market, private space companies can use their profits to 
reinvest into technology and ensure that the United States remains 
dominant in the new space race. 
One counterargument seems commonsensical, in that even if 
U.S. technology growth slows, China will have a harder time catching 
up if the United States completely halts satellite exports to Hong Kong. 
However, if China doesn’t get commercial satellite technology from 
the United States, then they will get it from other competitors. For 
example, a “2012 risk assessment of the United States’ export control 
policy conducted by the Departments of State and Commerce” said 
that “[c]urrent law forces the U.S. Government to continue to protect 
commonly available satellites and related items on the [USML], thus 
impeding the U.S. ability to work with partners and putting U.S. 
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manufacturers at a disadvantage, but providing no noticeable benefit 
to national security.”150 
Additionally, when commercial satellite exports were severely 
restricted under ITAR, U.S. companies went as far as to market “ITAR-
free product lines” to European buyers.151 The extreme restrictions 
caused European firms who built, launched, or operated American 
space technology to consider “American know-how [as] a liability.”152 
Between restrictions on commonly available satellites and 
frustrated international markets, the conclusion that China will 
eventually purchase CCS technology is clear. If it is not the United 
States that makes the sale to China or Hong Kong, some other global 
entity will fill the gap. In this scenario, the only player not profiting in 
some manner will be the United States In addition, because of the 
United States’ inability to “regulate how a satellite’s bandwidth is used 
once the device is in space,”153 it is likely that the workaround of U.S. 
law by AsiaSat can be done by any company or country, not only a 
company in Hong Kong. 
In summary, the national security of the United States would 
benefit from maintaining and improving open trade of commercial 
satellites with Hong Kong. This is because less restrictive export 
controls of CCSs to Hong Kong would allow the United States to 
reinvest into its own technology, thus maintaining an edge over China. 
Additionally, even if the United States halted trade with Hong Kong 
completely, China would eventually obtain this technology through 
some other method. 
C. Recommendations the NDAA Should Consider 
Because both Hong Kong’s independence and the United 
States’ national security rely on open markets between Hong Kong and 
the United States, any new rules considered by the Department of 
Commerce under the NDAA should keep economic freedom as a 
priority. Two possible suggestions would be 1) to put less stringent 
control on exports of commercial satellites while explicitly stating 
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what types of technology are not to be transferred, and 2) to legislate 
contractual obligations between satellite manufacturers and their 
foreign buyers that allow regulation of how commercial satellite 
bandwidth is regulated. 
Relaxing the restrictions on commercial satellites export would 
be a massive boon to the relationship between Hong Kong and the 
United States. Hong Kong’s ability to prosper economically through 
free trade would reinforce and reinvigorate its democratic movements 
against its communist oppressors, as well as further strengthen 
Western ideals of freedom. Of course, there is the risk that China 
would eventually make use of CCS technology for nefarious purposes, 
but as discussed above, that risk is present whether or not the United 
States continues trade with Hong Kong. 
Balancing national security and economics is difficult because 
the U.S. export control system, as Obama’s then-Defense Secretary 
Gates described it, is a “byzantine amalgam of authorities, roles, and 
missions scattered around different parts of the federal 
government.”154 However, the Trump Administration continues to 
follow Obama’s path of narrowing and specifying the items subject to 
ITAR regulations.155 The NDAA should lead to further legislation that 
makes it a priority to specifically state what items, if made a part of 
commercial satellites, cannot be exported. Through extreme 
specificity, the United States can avoid the old problem of losing its 
share of the global marketplace, resulting from foreign buyers’ 
hesitance to deal with an overly strict ITAR regime. 
Finally, it is possible that the United States finds a way to 
regulate the use of satellite bandwidth once exported. If the United 
States had the ability to regulate bandwidth, then the AsiaSat issue 
would be moot.156 However, this will surely prove difficult. One 
possibility is to force contractual obligations between U.S. satellite 
manufacturers and foreign buyers that require compliance with U.S. 
use-of-bandwidth regulations. However, two major problems stem 
from this idea. First, the United States has already seen the use of a 
tangled web of companies and countries in China’s attempt to 
purchase a satellite through Global IP. There is simply no way to 
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guarantee that as the satellite changes hands from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction that any contractual obligation will be honored. Second, 
the United States runs into the same problem of economic 
unfeasibility. The global marketplace would simply be less inclined to 
purchase a satellite that has additional cost associated with U.S. 
compliance. This would ultimately lead to a loss in the United States’ 
share of the global CCS market, which would lead to a decrease in 
competitiveness and national security. One of the foreign markets is, 
of course, Hong Kong, with whom the United States should want to 
improve economic relations, not restrict them. Thus, it appears that 
any severe economic inhibitors would risk both Hong Kong and the 
United States’ economic and national security. Therefore, the NDAA 
should indeed focus on solutions that open free markets, not close 
them. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
If Hong Kong’s independence and democracy are to last 
beyond 2047, it will require strong economic ties with the United 
States. Although the transfer of satellite technology through 
companies like AsiaSat and Global IP are of concern, the United States 
should not make any drastic changes to the free market relationship it 
currently has with Hong Kong. Through free trade, and a less 
restrictive export control regime over the sale of commercial satellites, 
the United States can both support the independence of Hong Kong 
and bolster its own national security. The other option, to restrict or 
abandon trade with Hong Kong, will surely result in a two-prong 
negative where Hong Kong is left to China’s encroachment, and the 
United States will once again lag in the global marketplace of 
commercial satellites. 
 
 
